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Anyone who has studied military history will be familiar with soldiers’ acute 
sensitivity to questions of precedence and honour. Most military historians take this for 
granted, although there is a growing appreciation that this type of phenomenon in the military 
is worthy of study, since institutional cultures can have a crucial operational significance.1 
Armies are hierarchical organisations, wherein formal rank is only achieved at great personal 
cost – be it by purchase, qualification or service – and where individual reputations are hard 
won and easily lost. These organisations have usually been all-male, and questions of status 
in the military have commonly been articulated in terms of masculine honour, creating further 
potential for rivalry and offence.2 Christopher Duffy has noted that the officers of European 
armies in the eighteenth century were particularly ‘rancorous and touchy’.3 In the Georgian 
military, disputes between officers over apparently trivial matters routinely escalated into 
exchanges of insults, blows and challenges to duel. Recourse was made with surprising 
frequency to the formal military authorities to resolve disputes, whether by courts martial4 or 
via the personal intervention of senior officers, the Secretary at War or even the King 
himself. 
Nowhere was this truer than in England’s militia. Reformed in 1757 as a parallel 
establishment to the regular army, it was officered by civilians who qualified by virtue of 
their social rank and landed property, and who thus provided ‘natural’ leaders to the civilian 
men who were balloted to serve in the county regiments. This equation of social with military 
rank may have simplified relations between militia officers – ‘Sir John or Sir Thomas must 
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not be commanded by Squire any thing’ – but had potential for tension when militia and 
regular officers came into contact with each another. Militia officers were at once aware of 
their social superiority to their regular counterparts, and were sensitive to accusations of 
military inferiority. As a correspondent to the Gentleman’s Magazine complained: ‘The 
present method taken for chusing the officers, and ascertaining their rank, has no regard to 
the necessary qualifications or abilities of the person to be commissioned’.5 In general, the 
militia was from the outset vulnerable to comparison with the regulars. Although they were 
dressed and armed alike, the militia were by definition part-timers who were usually 
inexperienced in combat, and who often relied on NCOs from the regulars to conduct their 
training. The army slang terms ‘parish soldier’ and ‘tame army’ give a flavour of the standing 
in which the militia was held by the rank and file in the army,6 and arguably the feeling was 
mutual. 
Historians of the Georgian militia have had little to say about its relationship with the 
regular army. Although J. R. Western explains how the militia was born out of political 
hostility to the ‘standing army’, he does not consider whether this manifested itself in practice 
after 1757: he notes one incident at Stowmarket barracks in 1801 where a ‘big fight’ took 
place between regulars and militia.7 Stephen Conway argues that, in the camps of the 
American War, ‘contact between officers of the various militia and regular units was both 
frequent and largely amicable’.8 A few examples will suffice to illustrate that this was not 
always the case. The Morning Chronicle reported that ‘there was but little union between the 
regulars and militia’ encamped near Portsmouth in 1778: the Cornish Militia and the 13th 
Regiment ‘heartily, I believe, hated each other’.9 Meanwhile, at Coxheath, General Keppel 
acquired a reputation for hostility towards militia officers. He objected to their habit of taking 
absence without leave, and clamped down upon it by means of courts martial and ordering 
them to their tents. When Mr. Joliffe, an officer in the Hampshire Militia and an MP, 
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complained about the quality of the men’s bread, Keppel’s reply was so high-handed that ‘he 
immediately threw up his commission, ordered a chaise and four, and drove to town’. ‘If 
Government was anxiously desirous of disgusting the militia,’ mused the Gazetteer, ‘they 
could not fix on any Lieutenant-General better calculated for that service’.10 
This antipathy continued into the French Wars. A private letter of October 1801 
reported a ‘terrible fray’ at Colchester, when ‘some of the 29th Regt who being intoxicated 
chose to abuse the Militia in the Barracks of 2d York’: ‘their men coming to extreme disorder 
& blood must have been shed but unexpected & most fortunate General Balfour arrived in the 
midst of this Business, ordered every Man to keep in his Quarters & the 29th to d’bark early 
next Morning’.11 Unfortunately bloodshed was not always avoided. On Christmas Eve 1808, 
some militiamen of the North Lincolns were drinking in a public house in Colchester, when a 
party of the 4th Regiment of Foot arrived. The regulars demanded their place by the fire, 
which was granted them, and then proceeded to abuse the militiamen as ‘feather-bed 
soldiers’. One of the regulars, Richard Costello, then became violent and struck William 
Wrach with a poker. He died from a fractured skull, and Costello and two other soldiers were 
tried at the Essex Assizes, receiving death sentences that were later respited.12 The tragic 
outcome of this dispute sets it apart, but the dispute itself revolved around familiar issues of 
precedence and very gendered evaluations of what constituted a soldier. 
This chapter will explore relations between the army and militia, and in particular 
their officers, by focusing on one regiment, the Lincolnshire Militia. Disputes of this kind 
appear to have dogged the regiment in its early years. In particular, it was involved in two 
related incidents in 1761 where minor questions of decorum escalated into major disputes 
that drew in the War Office and the King. By focusing on these two affairs in detail, this 
chapter will think about interpersonal conduct in the military more widely. Whilst Arthur 
Gilbert is right to characterise the Georgian officer corps as ‘an exclusive club with its own 
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distinctive values’,13 I will show how military discourse and honour codes were also indebted 
to civilian codes such as politeness, gentility and sensibility – and how their slightly different 
inflections on the parts of the army and militia could lead to conflict between these two 
branches of the service. 
 
Stamford, April 1761 
The creators of the militia anticipated that the social rank of its officers could create 
‘jealousy and complications’ between regiments, and so devised clear rules of precedence.14 
There remained confusion, however, about relations within regiments and with the regulars. 
Lincolnshire was one of the first counties to comply with the Militia Act, but was beset by 
conflicts of precedence from the off. Given the size of the county, the Lord Lieutenant 
divided the regiment in two. Sir John Cust was Colonel of the Southern Battalion: an MP for 
Grantham and later Speaker of the House of Commons, he had been an active supporter of 
the Militia Bill in parliament.15 He was anxious to resolve which battalion should be shown 
favour, since ‘many Difficulties were likely to arise at their meeting’.16 In May 1760 he wrote 
to the Secretary at War for clarification, who judged that the Earl of Scarborough’s Northern 
Battalion would take precedence due to the earlier date of his commission. Relations between 
the two battalions remained tense. After being stationed in Manchester, the regiment was 
ordered to return to the county for the winter. Cust raced the Southern Battalion back in order 
to obtain quarters at Lincoln, ‘the only good Town in the County’. Scarborough upbraided 
Cust for this ‘ungenteell’ action and, following an acrimonious correspondence, the South 
Lincolns were eventually quartered in Stamford instead.17 
It was at Stamford that the South Lincolns were involved in a dispute with the 72nd 
Regiment, known as the Duke of Richmond’s. Such a dispute may well have been amplified 
by the fact that they were stationed in their own county: militia regiments were more usually 
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stationed away from home in wartime, so they may have felt more hostile to outside soldiers 
when on home territory.18 We know about the incident in detail because the War Office 
created a letter book copying all sides of the subsequent correspondence between the 
Secretary at War Charles Townshend and the various protagonists. The existence of this letter 
book suggests that the War Office considered the dispute to be significant: as the militia was 
in its early days, it was an indication of likely further disputes, and a precedent for how to 
resolve them.19 In addition, further letters in the Cust papers and in Lincolnshire Archives 
mean that over forty letters survive that relate to the affair. It was not reported in the press at 
the time, although two of Townshend’s letters were widely reprinted after his death, as an 
example of how he was capable of handling ‘a very delicate Occasion’.20 
On 14 June 1761, the 72nd Foot marched towards Stamford, following a route 
prescribed by the War Office from their winter quarters in Yorkshire to a new posting on the 
south coast. The First Division under Major Thomas Troughear marched straight into town, 
without acknowledging that the South Lincolns were already quartered there. Lieutenant 
Colonel William Welby took umbrage at this, since it disregarded the convention that a body 
of troops entering a garrison should send an officer ahead to seek permission to do so. As he 
explained to Townshend: ‘I thought I had a right as Commanding officer of the Garrison to 
have leave asked, before any Troops entered the Town; for I apprehend it is the rule of 
Discipline, and for the safety of the Garrison that those Ceremonies are always complied 
with.’ Welby chose to overlook this, and ordered that they be granted all the civilities due to 
another regiment, including the parole and details of the town duty, and provided a sentry at 
Troughear’s door and ordered the ‘Centinels to rest [arms] to him’. Major Troughear sent his 
adjutant to explain that, ‘he had no right to the Compliments paid him as being of a different 
Corps’. The Major himself then arrived, who insisted that, ‘there was no sort of Connexion 
between us & them,’ and that he would provide his own parole. As the Major left he passed 
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the sentry, who rested arms: ‘the Major told him not to do it to him, the Militia man told him 
it was the order, but he said he had no right to rest to him, unless he (the Sentry) had been a 
soldier, the man replied he was a soldier’.21 
Welby saw this as ‘a great Slight to the Corps, and the Militia in general’ and so took 
the unusual step of posting sentries at the entrances to Stamford, ‘to prevent any armed 
Troops entering the Town for the future without my knowledge and consent’. So when the 
pioneers of the Second Division tried to enter the town on 17 June without sending advance 
word, the militia sentries stopped them at the point of their bayonets.22 The militia corporal in 
charge of the guard approached Captain Morris of the 72nd and asked that they send an 
officer to Welby, but Morris cursed the corporal and the militia, and replied that, ‘he would 
not be stoped by him, or anybody else’. The pioneers rushed forward and Morris attempted to 
brush away a sentry’s bayonet with his espontoon, which grazed the sentry and would have 
stabbed him had it not hit his cartridge box. At length, Morris went to see Welby, where he 
explained that his regiment never had anything to do with the militia. By way of justification, 
he claimed that George II had once explained to Richmond that, ‘they were the King’s 
soldiers, & the Militia the Country’s’. Welby replied that since they both received the King’s 
pay, the militia ‘were to be treated as much Soldiers as the Regulars’.23 As they could not 
come to an agreement on this point, Welby resolved to write to the War Office. 
Thus began a bad tempered correspondence that would preoccupy the Secretary at 
War for the following two months. Townshend wrote to Troughear, expressing that he was 
‘very seriously concern’d to find that any distinctions have been made between the different 
Corps of His Majesty’s Army’. He enclosed a copy of Welby’s account and invited the Major 
to comment upon it.24 Troughear denied that he had made any remarks to the sentry and 
insisted that the militia had acted aggressively: Morris ‘saw the Centinels present their 
Bayonets to the breasts of the Pioneers & refuse them admission into the town, without 
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giving any reason’. But he made no attempt to disown the remarks that he or Morris made 
about the respective positions of the army and militia, and indeed insisted that, ‘no officer 
who bears the King’s Commission, should be under the orders of those who have not the 
King’s Commission’. He furthermore lodged a complaint about Welby’s attempt to halt the 
72nd regiment, given that they were marching a route prescribed by the War Office.25 
Townshend’s reply suggests that he took exception both to Troughear’s tone and his claims.26 
It furthermore emerged over the course of the investigation that the 72nd Regiment had form 
in this regard, since complaints about their behaviour towards the Militias of Leicestershire 
and Essex came to light.27 
Meanwhile, Welby wrote to Sir John Cust, detailing his view of the affair and alleging 
that the regulars had ‘behaved unbecomingly’. Cust reassured Welby that he approved of his 
conduct, and proceeded to draft a letter for Welby to send to Townshend, wherein he pressed 
the militia’s claims: 
 
I beg leave to assure you, Sir, I have made it my particular study to cultivate Harmony 
and a good understanding between the two Corps, being sensible how very prejudicial 
any dispute must be to His Majesty’s Service, I should not do justice to the Gentlemen 
of the army, if I did not take this opportunity of acknowledging that they have 
uniformly shown the same good disposition, and that I have been treated with the 
greatest Politeness and Civility from the officers of the several Corps we have met, till 
Major Troughear came into Stamford with the first Division of the 72nd Regiment. 
 
Rather theatrically, he begged the Secretary at War to point out where he had been at fault: ‘It 
is very natural for a gentleman who has liv’d upon his Estates without making Arms his 
profession, but who has taken them up occasionally to shew his zeal for His Majesty’s 
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Family, person & government to fall into Mistakes’. He concluded by requesting that a 
special court martial be convened, composed of both militia and regular officers, to settle the 
case.28 His request was not granted, and never could have been given that such a court would 
not have been possible under either the Articles of War or the Militia Act. 
At length, Townshend sought to conclude the case by writing letters of censure to 
both Troughear and Welby on 12 June. In both cases he explained how he had reported the 
facts of the case to the King, and that the judgement therefore proceeded from him. Welby 
received the lighter censure: the King reaffirmed that he had a right to receive notice from an 
approaching regiment, and that he had a right ‘to receive & pay those reciprocal marks of 
Civility & respect which in the course of Service usually pass’. On the other hand, Welby 
was informed that he exceeded his duty in posting sentries and preventing the 72nd from 
entering an open town: ‘the consequences of the measure you took might have been 
extensive, and very fatal to the Regiments concerned’.29 Townshend clearly intended this to 
be the end to the matter, but Welby wrote further letters contesting the verdict and pressing 
his request for a court martial.30 Furthermore, Cust took up Welby’s case. In a series of letters 
he took great exception to the censure aimed at Welby, which he perceived ‘as a douceur to 
the Army or a sort of salvo to their Honour’.31 His persistence on this point clearly irritated 
the Secretary at War: his brother Peregrine encountered Townshend in London, where he 
‘flew into a very great passion’ and claimed that the actions of the South Lincolns ‘wou’d in 
his opinion be a means of putting an end to ye Militia in this Country’.32 Peregrine had 
subsequently to smooth things over with Townshend by thanking him for the trouble they had 
given him. 
The censure sent to Major Troughear was more comprehensive. The King judged that 
he acted contrary to the practice of the army in refusing to accept the South Lincolns’ marks 
of civility. He furthermore expressed his ‘entire disapprobation of all distinctions’ made 
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between the army and militia, contrary to ‘that Equality and harmony in Service which is so 
much to be wished & cultivated, both upon the grounds of private satisfaction and of public 
utility’.33 In contrast to the militia officer, the regular officer appears to have accepted the 
judgement. (The affair did not appear to do his career any harm, since he was shortly 
promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and Deputy Governor of the Isle of Wight.34) Indeed, 
Townshend wrote to Welby reporting a conversation with Troughear, whereby he ‘expressed 
to me in the strongest terms, his sense & conviction, of the impropriety of his conduct’.35 
This mea culpa helped to bring the matter to a close, since Welby expressed his satisfaction 
with it and hoped that it would ‘effectually prevent all misunderstandings for the future’ 
between the army and militia.36 As we will now see, his optimism on this point was to be 
short lived. 
 
Lincoln, December 1761 
Later in the year, the South Lincolns’ other Lieutenant Colonel, Philips Glover, was 
involved in a comparable dispute with regular soldiers at Lincoln. According to Welby, 
Philips Glover was known for his ‘hasty temper and inconsiderate conduct’.37 His 
correspondence with Cust reveals disputes with other militiamen and a quarrel over a bet.38 
Indeed, when the Lincolns had been stationed at Manchester the previous year, he been 
involved in a petty dispute in a theatre that had got out of hand. An apothecary named 
Jackson struck him on the back in jest, but Glover objected in the strongest terms so a duel 
with swords was arranged. Glover ran him through and killed him, for which he was tried at 
the assizes, but was discharged due to lack of evidence.39 Glover found himself on trial again 
in February 1762, this time a general court martial for ‘having behaved in a Manner 
unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman’. The published Proceedings provide a detailed 
account of an incident that again sheds light on the relationship between the army and militia. 
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On Christmas Eve 1761, Philips Glover was lodging at the Angel Inn in Lincoln. The 
Marines had been recruiting in the town, and their recruiting sergeant had a new recruit 
named Coupland with him. A militiaman from the South Lincolns recognised the recruit as a 
deserter from his company and clapped his hand on his shoulder declaring, ‘You are my 
prisoner.’ They could not find any militia officers to confirm this – they were ‘gone out a 
Sporting’ – so they took Coupland to Captain James Gardiner of the Marines. Later that day, 
Gardiner, Glover and various other gentlemen were at the Angel Inn, where the dispute 
apparently occurred. Lieutenant Edward Willes of the South Lincolns suggested that the 
deserter be taken to a Justice of the Peace so that the Corporal who enlisted him could swear 
to him being a deserter. Gardiner objected to this: the civilian authorities handled militia 
recruiting, and to do so would have been to forfeit his recruit, so he insisted that he remain 
under military authority. Glover said that he would write to the War Office, and Gardiner 
replied that he would not give up the prisoner until their answer was received. It was at this 
point that Glover uttered the words that prompted Gardiner to request a court martial: ‘By 
God, he would not be bilked by him or any Regular.’40 
The language that Glover used, and the tone that he employed, was exhaustively 
examined by the court martial. The term ‘bilk’, meaning to defraud or swindle, was deemed 
language ‘which ought not to pass between one Officer and another’. He was asked whether 
he had also used the expressions, ‘That he would shew the Regulars what their duty was?’ 
and ‘That he would trust no Regular?’, both of which he denied.41 Willes deposed that Glover 
‘seemed rather warm’ and Gardiner was ‘cool’ at the point at which the prisoner was 
delivered to them. Other witnesses were questioned regarding Glover’s tone. Reverend 
Moreton deposed, ‘That Lieutenant Colonel Glover has not the softest Manner of expressing 
himself; but at the Time spoke with more than his ordinary Vehemence.’ And Gardiner added 
that Glover, ‘puts a greater Stress upon his Words, than other People do’.42 
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The most revealing aspect of the trial was the publication of letters that had passed 
between Glover and Gardiner. Both were aware that these letters would become matters of 
public record: indeed Gardiner published them in advance of the trial, which Glover alleged 
was an attempt to prejudice its outcome. In the first letter, Gardiner insisted that he would 
only release the prisoner on production of sufficient proof. Glover replied that he could 
provide ten men to swear to that effect, whereupon Gardiner claimed that Glover did not 
understand ‘what sufficient Military Proof of a Deserter is’, namely his attestation. He then 
launched into a diatribe about the respective mastery of military matters by army and militia 
officers: 
 
In the Army, superior Rank implies superior Knowledge of Discipline, because it 
supposes superior Experience: but in the Militia, where Officers Rank merely from 
their Fortune, and where, from the Lieutenant Colonel to the Ensign, the Experience is 
all equal, I flatter myself common Candour will at least allow me to have as true and 
just an Idea of Military Discipline, as any Field Officer in your Service, who 
themselves have been instructed in what they know of it by Officers of my Rank, or 
inferior to it.43 
 
Glover replied: ‘I can assure you, we are obliged to no Regulars for our Knowledge in 
Military Affairs; and what we have acquired by constant Application and Reading, the latter 
of which many in your Rank have not in their Power to do.’44 In order to emphasise his point 
that the army are capable of making mistakes regarding military conduct, he referred the 
regular to Troughear’s acknowledgement of fault in the Stamford affair: this was also offered 
to the court martial but was deemed inadmissible. 
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After five days of trial, the court found the militiaman ‘guilty of having used some 
Expressions towards Captain Richard Gardiner not strictly becoming an Officer, which 
appear to have proceeded from Warmth, occasioned in Part by some Provocation on the part 
of Captain Gardiner’. Glover was ordered to receive a reprimand from his Colonel. Ironically, 
a later ruling from the Judge-Advocate’s Office revealed that Gardiner was not answerable to 
a court martial, as he was not actually an officer at the time of the offence. The King 
nevertheless expressed his disapprobation at his making ‘odious and unjustifiable Distinction 
between the Militia and his Majesty’s other Regiments’, and the Judge-Advocate trusted that 
this royal admonition was punishment enough.45 
  
Honour, Status and Rivalry 
These two cases suggest the importance of interpersonal conduct in the Georgian 
military. By studying disputes that occurred when things went wrong, the historian can get an 
insight into the normal expectations of civility, precedence and honour that structured 
everyday interactions in the military. These disputes also show the sheer amount of time and 
effort that was expended on these matters by senior officers and the military authorities, 
suggesting how seriously they were taken. As we conclude this chapter with reflections on 
the nature of these disputes and what they tell us about the culture of the military, it is first 
worth considering the mechanisms that were used to resolve them. 
Primary among these mechanisms was the court martial. Although the court martial 
ostensibly existed to maintain military law and discipline, the vague charge of ‘conduct 
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman’ could cover a wide range of interpersonal issues. As 
Alan Gilbert has argued, the military’s honour code could come into conflict with military 
law, so it was useful to have a charge flexible enough to encompass this.46 What is striking 
about the court martial for ‘conduct unbecoming’ was that it was often requested by the 
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protagonists themselves. As we have seen, Gardiner was granted one, and Welby was 
probably only refused because of his unusual request about how it should be composed. 
There is a parallel here with recent work on the civilian courts, which has shown how 
Georgians ‘used’ the law to their own ends. Robert Shoemaker has suggested that Londoners 
had recourse to the courts to resolve public insults, although in the period when this was 
declining in the civilian sphere it showed no sign of doing so in the military.47 It might seem 
surprising that soldiers should wish to do this, given the court martial’s rather negative 
historical reputation for the apparent arbitrariness of its verdicts and brutality of its 
punishments. But, as we saw in the Glover-Gardiner dispute, the court took its time to hear 
evidence from a number of witnesses, and the punishments that it delivered were ‘honour’ 
punishments – reprimand from superiors and royal admonition – that arguably befitted the 
charges. The prospect of being tried by one’s peers was attractive to soldiers, and especially 
so in the case of honour disputes. On the other hand, there appears to have been a wider 
public perception that soldiers were too quick to go down this route. One commentator on the 
Glover-Gardiner case suggested that it, ‘affords a caution to officers, not to be too precipitate 
in demanding courts-martial upon every frivolous altercation, the issue of which seldom 
redounds to the honour of either party’.48 
Nevertheless, the court martial remained a useful means of resolving honour disputes 
between military men. This was particularly the case when a dispute was in danger of 
escalating into a duel, which was forbidden under the Articles of War: a court martial for 
‘conduct unbecoming’ was a useful way of heading this off. Duelling is of course highly 
relevant to issues of masculine honour: it is a large subject in its own right, although some 
points are worth making here. Gender scholars have demonstrated how the duel was central 
to elite male notions of honour, as a means of demonstrating one’s refinement and courage.49 
Soldiers were disproportionately given to duel, comprising around a third of all duellists in 
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the mid-century and rising towards its end.50 This was an aspect of elite masculinity that was 
peculiarly accessible to military men, so their willingness to duel was in a sense socially 
aspirational. Militia officers may have felt under even more pressure that their regular 
counterparts to go down the duelling route – as Phillips Glover did in Manchester – in order 
to prove their soldierly credentials. One prominent gentleman of the 1760s who was famous 
for duelling was the radical politician John Wilkes: he was a Lieutenant Colonel in the 
Buckinghamshire militia, an organisation that reinforced his claims to being a patriot and a 
classical warrior-citizen. By fighting duels, he was proving his martial virtus and virility, as 
well as making a claim to equality with the aristocrats he fought, by proving that he too 
possessed gracious courage and gentlemanly accomplishments.51 The duel therefore serves to 
illustrate the overlap of military and civilian honour codes. 
A further mechanism for resolving disputes was by requesting the intercession of the 
Secretary at War. War Office in-letter books show that a significant proportion of their 
correspondence concerned disputes between individuals. In June 1778, Lord Hardwicke 
wrote to Barrington in anticipation of problems when the militia was called out, asking what 
the procedure for settling disputes would be, ‘sh[oul]d any Regimental Differences arise, 
either ab[ou]t the Discipline of the Corps, or Behaviour of Officers to each other’.52 Often 
these concerned issues of precedence: cases that hinged on dates of commission could usually 
be settled easily by the Secretary at War.53 As the King’s minister, he was also the conduit for 
issues that had to be resolved by the Commander in Chief himself: the King personally got 
involved in both of the disputes studied here, even though they concerned the minutiae of 
everyday military interaction. The King was anxious in both cases to intervene where a 
dispute served to disrupt the ‘equality and harmony’ between the branches of the service.54 
Although Peregrine Cust sought an audience with the Townshend in person, the 
Secretary at War usually conducted this kind of business by letter. The conventions of polite 
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correspondence therefore structured the way in which these disputes were resolved. The 
deferential conventions of letter writing, with its sensitivity to questions of honour and 
personal sincerity, were peculiarly apt for these kinds of dispute. The polite letter also blurred 
the distinction between public and private correspondence: Sir John Cust begged Townshend 
that he might ‘speak my mind freely to you upon this occasion, & to do it with more freedom 
I address myself to you in a private letter’, but the tone and content of this letter were in fact 
little different to his others.55 The personality and epistolary style of the Secretary at War 
therefore had a significant impact on how issues such as this were handled. Barrington’s 
businesslike approach contrasts with that of Townshend, who had a reputation for being 
difficult and emotional. His biographer Sir Lewis Namier notes that his letters had a habit of 
finding fault ‘by putting forced constructions on what the other has said’: this is certainly 
perceptible in some of his correspondence on the Stamford affair and may partly be to blame 
for why it subsequently got out of hand. 56 
More generally, the code of politeness informed military behaviour. Politeness had 
come into vogue at the beginning of the eighteenth century, with the aim of softening male 
manners, moderating behaviour and easing social interaction.57 This might seem incompatible 
with the masculinity of the soldier, but Philip Carter has shown how even the ‘man of war’ 
was expected to embrace polite manners.58 Indeed, given the formality of military manners 
and the importance in the army of such ‘polite’ practices as bodily comportment, fine dress 
and heterosexual gallantry, soldiers took to the culture of politeness in a big way, and it 
continued to be important in the regular army even after it was losing vogue in civilian 
society.59 Disputes could therefore occur where behaviour was perceived to be impolite: 
Welby complained that the 72nd Regiment acted ‘very contrary to ... polite behaviour’ when 
they entered Stamford.60 And much of Glover’s trial hinged on his failure to live up to the 
polite standards of military interaction, from his choice of words to the tone of his voice. 
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‘Civility’ was a hugely important standard in military life, and the Stamford affair 
fundamentally concerned the 72nd’s failure to observe ‘reciprocal marks of civility and 
respect’, those rituals and courtesies that ensured the smooth running of military life. 
Other aspects of civilian manners are perceptible in these disputes. The cult of 
‘sensibility’ prized emotional expression and sincerity, and in the second half of the century it 
began to inform male manners, in part as an antidote to the potential falsity of politeness.61 In 
contrast with the army, where politeness had such an enduring hold, I have argued elsewhere 
that the creation of the New Militia had been justified along sentimental lines, in terms of 
harnessing the patriotic and protective feelings of the male citizen.62 It is perhaps significant, 
then, that it is in the correspondence of militia officers that we see regular recourse to the 
culture of feeling. Sir John Cust informed Townshend that Welby was ‘excessively affected’ 
by the censure in his letter: ‘such a reproof must lie very heavy upon a Gentleman who is 
conscious of his own good intentions’.63  His whole corps were apparently ‘very sensibly 
affected’ by the way Welby had been treated.64 Militia officers often had recourse to the 
language of feeling when pursuing a complaint with the War Office. George Buck, 
Lieutenant Colonel of the North Devonshire Militia, complained to Barrington that he had 
been wronged by his fellow officers: ‘Thus situated, superseded, and calumniated, I cannot 
express, being conscious of innocence, of integrity of conduct, and of zeal for the service, nor 
can any one, but an officer of sensibility, under similar circumstances, conceive the anguish 
of my mind!’65 
Finally, these disputes give us an insight into the identity of the soldier, and in 
particular the different ways in which the regular army and the militia perceived themselves 
and each other. The officers of the 72nd sought ‘no connexion’ with the militia since they did 
not regard them as proper soldiers: as ‘the Country’s’ soldiers rather than the King’s, who did 
not hold proper commissions, and therefore should not be obeyed nor shown marks of 
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respect. The contempt between Gardiner and Glover was mutual. Glover was adamant that he 
would not be ‘Bilked ... by any Regular’, a group of people who he regarded as impoverished 
and illiterate. In the appendix to the printed Proceedings, the two antagonists took the 
opportunity further to explain and defend their conduct. Here, Glover revelled in the militia’s 
self identity as the constitutional force that patriotically defended Britain against invaders. He 
provoked Gardiner by characterising the job of the militia as defending liberty and property – 
‘the latter of which you can have no Idea of’.66 This prompted a lengthy reply from Gardiner, 
in which he reflected upon the identity of the regular soldier: 
 
I must confess, I am no Man of Property, it is my Misfortune, not my Crime, that I am 
not; but there have been Officers who, with as little Property as I have, have fought 
nobly and gallantly for the Property of others; and though it never fell to my particular 
Duty to expose my Life at Home, for the Estates and Patrimonies of my Countrymen, 
[yet] I have ventured it in Action with our enemies Abroad... In regard to my Liberty, 
my Lord, I do from my Heart believe, that the Liberties of this Kingdom are as dear to 
the Soldiers of Great Britain, as to the Inhabitants of it.67 
 
Whereas the critique of ‘standing armies’ would have it that regular soldiers were unpatriotic 
mercenaries and a danger to liberty, they did not appear to have imbibed this identity, and 
indeed saw themselves in quite the opposite light.68 
In conclusion, then, it is hardly surprising that the Georgian army and militia had an 
antagonistic relationship. Set up as parallel establishments, they inevitably came into conflict 
in their day-to-day interactions. In a practical sense, they became rivals in recruiting, as we 
saw in the Glover-Gardiner case. The army was not permitted to recruit from the militia, and 
the army commonly complained that the militia ballot sapped their pool of recruits and that 
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its system of paying ‘substitutes’ pushed up the cost of bounties. More pervasively, the 
creation of two identical hierarchies with identical ranks, but where officers qualified in 
different ways and were unsure about questions of precedence, complicated everyday 
encounters between the branches of the service. As we have seen, the army and militia had 
contrasting identities that were defined against one another, which could lead to mutual 
distrust and even contempt. It is certainly possible to detect a defensiveness on the part of 
militia officers regarding their military status and expertise, and on the part of the army 
regarding their political status and social standing. 
When studying the values and manners of officers, it is important to consider the 
extent of overlap between the military and civilian spheres. The court martial charge of 
‘conduct unbecoming’ shows how the standards expected of an officer were inseparable from 
those of a gentleman. But it is possible that officers from the regulars and the militia – who 
necessarily had different relationships with mainstream society – inflected social codes in 
subtly different ways. The regular army’s commitment to a very formal model of polite 
masculinity, and the militia’s readiness to embrace the new civilian vogue for male feeling, 
suggest that the antagonism between them could often be a comedy of manners. From the 
point of view of military history, inter-service rivalry is worth studying in its own right; but 
the case of the militia and the regular army in the mid-Georgian period also promises to shed 
light on the relationship between the military and society. 
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